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Abstract 
Are there any indications that a Technological Singularity may be on the horizon? In trying to answer these questions, the 
authors made a small introduction to the area of safety research in artificial intelligence. The authors review some of the current 
paradigms in the development of autonomous intelligent systems, searching for evidence that may indicate the coming of a 
possible Technological Singularity. Finally, the authors present a reflection using the COVID-19 pandemic, something that 
showed that global society's biggest problem in managing existential risks is its lack of coordination skills as a global society. 
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Artificial Intelligence (AI) research is an interdisciplinary endeavor by nature, given the various fields that 
participate and benefit from its development. When we talk about AI, either in the context of computer science 
(Sutton & Barto,1998; Russell & Norvig, 2003; Wang, 2019) or in the study of the philosophy of the mind (Searle, 
1980; Haugeland, 1985; Newell, 1990; Chalmers, 2010), a certain dichotomy is utilized to classify two different 
types of AI: Narrow (1) and General (2) (Shane & Hutter, 2007):  
1. Narrow intelligence: Also known as “weak” AI, narrow AI is how we define intelligent systems that we 
are used to interacting within our daily lives. Such systems are only proficient in specific tasks and unable 
to generalize their skills to domains outside their training environment; 
2. General intelligence: also referred to as “strong” AI, or artificial general intelligence (AGI), which consists 
of an hypothetical intelligent system capable of solving many types of problems proficiently, in any 
domain, or at least in a wide range of domains. 
AGI (depending on how we interpret the word “general”) would be something capable of covering all possible 
tasks. Those that humans are specifically good at. Those that animals are specifically good at. And all that goes 
beyond our imagination (Chollet, 2019). However, a more modest definition would be to define an AGI as a system 
that exceeds human cognitive ability in any domain of interest (Müller & Bostrom, 2016). 
Moravec (1998, p. 10) proposes an analogy where the advancement of AIs capabilities are compared to a “flood.” 
Fifty years ago, tasks previously performed exclusively by humans (e.g., human calculators) were “flooded” and 
replaced by the use of autonomous systems. We are increasingly taking refuge in the high peaks of the cognitive 
landscape, still reserved exclusively for us, while lower regions continue to be flooded. 
The authors' objective in this essay is to explore the following idea, “What if we are successful in developing 
AGI"? Vinge (1993) uses the term “Singularity” to define artificial intelligent systems/agents that have surpassed 
human intelligence. At the same time, “Singulitarianism” is the name used to describe the Transhumanist strand 
where the possibilities and consequences of creating a Technological Singularity in the medium-long future are 
discussed. Given this possibility, an active response is necessary to ensure that such an event is beneficial to our 
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society (Kurzweil, 2005; Naude, 2009; Chalmers, 2010; Lombardo, 2012; Tegmark, 2017). 
Irving J. Good was one of the first academics to speculate on the possibility of an “ultraintelligent machine” 
(Singularity): 
Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities 
of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an 
ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an 
“intelligence explosion”, and the intelligence of man would be left far behind […] Thus the first 
ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is 
docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. It is curious that this point is made so seldom 
outside of science fiction. It is sometimes worthwhile to take science fiction seriously. (Good, 1965, p. 
33) 
However, would there be any indication that an intelligence explosion is something, however unlikely, still 
possible? Perhaps.  
One can already find in the literature the first indications of autonomous systems assisting in the development of 
other autonomous systems. Zoph and Le (2017) proposed an autonomous technique for the development of artificial 
neural network architecture. According to the authors: “our method, starting from scratch, can design a new network 
architecture that rivals the best architecture invented by man” (Zoph & Le, 2017, p. 1). The authors developed their 
model using Reinforcement Learning (RL) to train their “architect” system of artificial neural networks. RL is one 
of the paradigms in the area of machine learning, where artificial agents must act in the environment that they are 
embedded and find an action policy that maximizes the cumulative reward return for a given reward function (i.e., 
the goal) (Russell & Norvig, 2003). 
Reward functions are a mathematical representation of the preferences that guide the behavior of agents operating 
by RL, where, for example, a cleaning robot can maximize a function that assigns high reward to world-states with 
“little dirt on the floor” and a low reward to world-states where the floor is dirty.  
Many of the models used to study idealized rational agents (e.g., Expected Utility Theory) provide convincing 
arguments that any rational agent with consistent preferences should act as an expected utility maximizer (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, within the framework of expected utility theory, there are corollary 
results that seem to refer to the concern of Good, quoted above: “as long as the machine is docile enough to tell us 
how to keep it under control” (Good, 1965, p. 33).  
Stephen Omohundro (2008) cites some characteristics that we should expect these types of agents (expected 
utility maximizers/RL agents) to possess, and Bostrom (2014, chapter 7, p. 110-112) popularized Omohundro's 
arguments in two theses:   
 Instrumental Convergence Thesis: Intelligent agents can have a wide range of possible terminal goals. 
However, certain instrumental goals can be pursued by almost all intelligent agents. Since these goals are 
means for the achievement of almost any terminal goal; 
 Orthogonality Thesis: Analogous to Hume's Guillotine (Is-Ought Gap), the orthogonality thesis dictates that 
ethical pronouncements for what should be cannot be achieved through factual analysis. Thus, both concepts 
(reason and morality) would be independent. As a result, terminal goals and levels of intelligence can freely 
vary in orthogonal axis.  
Turner, Smith, Shah and Tadepalli (2020) generalized the conjectures made by Omohundro and Bostrom in what 
the authors call the "Power-Seeking Theorems." In them, it is demonstrated that within the formalism of Markov 
decision processes (MDP), most reward functions encourage “power-seeking behavior.” Power, in MDPs, is the 
ability to achieve goals in general. It is instrumentally convergent to a wide range of reward functions to seek power. 
A corollary of the results demonstrated by Turner et al. (2020) is that even in simplified conditions, most reward 
functions induce power-seeking behavior, something that may cause safety problems involving the interaction of 
humans and AI (e.g., an AGI how has incentives to avoid its shutdown). 
In light of all these arguments, which date back to the early days of AI research, security issues have increasingly 
been cited in the literature. AI ethics, a sub-area of applied ethics concerned with adding moral behavior to machines 
and regulating the use of artificial intelligence, has gained a significant increase in popularity in the last two decades 
(Jobin, Ienca, & Vayena, 2019; Jurić, Šandić, & Brcic, 2020). At the same time, important philosophical and 
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technical questions are raised in the context of AI safety, e.g., Corrigibility: how to correct/terminate potentially 
faulty agents that have a strong instrumental incentive to preserve their terminal goals (Soares, Fallenstein, 
Yudkowsky, & Armstrong, 2015; Amodei et al., 2016)?  
One can also find in the literature several research agendas, where different types of ethical, technical, and social 
problems are discussed (Russell, Dewey, & Tegmark, 2015; Taylor, Yudkowsky, Lavictoire, & Critch, 2016; 
Tegmark, 2016; Soares, 2016; O'Keefe et al., 2020; ÓhÉigeartaigh, Whittlestone, Liu, Zeng, & Liu 2020; 
Hagendorff, 2020; Corrêa & De Oliveira, 2021). For example, how will we remedy the negative economic impacts 
of AI, such as mass automation and unemployment (Frey & Osborne, 2013)? How can we prevent the automation 
of jobs to increase the inequality relation among classes, genders, and races (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014)? Should 
autonomous weapons be banned (Docherty, 2012)? 
At one end of the spectrum, we find research involving existential risks, i.e., the study of possible threats at the 
extinction level imposed by present or future technology. Research centers such as the Centre for the Study of 
Existential Risk (Cambridge), Future of Life Institute (Harvard/MIT), Future of Humanity Institute (Oxford), 
Machine Intelligence Research Institute, and the Center for Human-Compatible AI (both at Berkeley) seek to 
develop strategies to mitigate these possible threats.   
Throughout this article, more arguments will be proposed to justify the type of research the authors address (AI 
Ethics and AI Safety). In the next section, two types of “scenarios” of how society could come to “lose control” are 
presented. 
AI Takeoff 
During the 20th century, a technological race led to the mass production of systems that we did not yet have a 
complete understanding of. Something that caused various side effects, such as accidents (Chernobyl disaster), the 
creation of weapons of mass destruction (Cold War), and even the use of these weapons against human society itself 
(bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki).  
Certainly that there are various pressures to develop high-performance AI, given its ability to provide the 
organization controlling it with a considerable strategic advantage. The great instrumental value in being the first 
global actor to control AGI may cause the same kind of technology race that we experienced in the mid-20th century. 
That is: “while X invests in the development of AI, Y will do as well.”   
Another reason to be cautious in our technological advances in the area of AI is that for an intelligent autonomous 
system to pose a potential danger to our society, it doesn't need to be smarter than us. It just needs to be more capable 
regarding certain types of tasks. Barrett and Baum (2017) explore two main reasons that would cause an artificial 
intelligence to represent a considerable danger to our society, reasons of capability (1) and value (2). 
1. Intelligent artificial agents can pose a danger to human well-being because of their extremely refined 
ability, or some aptitude, with which we cannot compete;  
2. Intelligent artificial agents can develop goals and objectives that diverge from us humans, and in pursuing 
them, cause damage to our society. 
ASI-PATH (Artificial Super Intelligence Pathway) is a model of how an AGI, becoming super intelligent through 
recursive self-improvement, could come to cause a catastrophe (Barrett & Baum, 2017). This model suggests 
scenarios where an AI, after achieving some DSA (Decisive Strategic Advantage), e.g., advances in nanotechnology, 
biological engineering, or robotics, could come to achieve a considerable level of control over the environment.  
What would be a “good example” of a DSA?   
Given our reliance on autonomous systems integrated with the Internet, one potentially damaging DSA would 
be to conduct cyberattacks on vital structures of our infrastructure, such as electricity distribution and 
telecommunications networks. In 2017, the crypto-ransomware “WannaCry” broke into systems in more than 99 
countries, even affecting the public health system of certain governments. More than 75,000 ransom demands were 
made, making it one of the most damaging cyberattacks in history (Larson, 2017). This would be a possible DSA 
of an AI, i.e., the ability to execute cyberattacks there our infrastructure in a way that we cannot remediate in time.  
ASI-PATH provides an intuitive diagram where several events (i.e., security breaches) must occur for a 
catastrophe involving AGI to occur. Initially, an AI, also called a seed AI, must first become an AI with some DSA, 
and at the same time, certain security measures must fail:  
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 Failure of AI confinement;  
 Unsuccessful value alignment;  
 AI's goals diverge from ours. 
To those interested, Sotala (2018, p. 317) provides a simplified overview of ASI-PATH in his paper “Disjunctive 
scenarios of catastrophic AI risk.” According to Barrett and Baum (2017), the arguments raised by the instrumental 
convergence thesis and the orthogonality thesis (i.e., power-seeking and terminal goal divergence) are some of the 
reasons that could lead a Singularity to engage in hostile actions against humanity 
The scenarios explored in the literature, where a seed AI is capable of becoming a Singularity, are usually 
characterized in two different types of takeoffs: Fast and Slow. Fast takeoffs suggest situations where a drastic 
takeover occurs, where abruptly we would be surprised by an entity much more capable, with possibly unknown 
objectives, inserted and sharing the same environment as us. In contrast, we have slow takeoffs, which are a much 
more realistic possibility.  It would occur gradually as the human species becomes more and more dependent, and 
in a way, under the control of advanced AI systems (Sotala, 2018). Such questions raise concerns, especially in the 
area of ethics and morals. Old questions are now reexamined in a new light, and even with a new sense of urgency. 
For AI development to be done in a way that minimizes the risk of existential threats to humanity, some questions 
still unanswered are:  
1. What strategies and policies should we adopt to ensure that the goals of advanced artificial agents are 
aligned with our interests?  
2. What restrictions to this project should we impose to ensure a beneficial outcome? 
3. Would there be predictions of when an AGI could be achieved? 
In the following sections, the authors answer some of these questions, starting with the last one. 
AGI On the Horizon?  
Technological forecasting is highly complex, and how pessimistic or optimistic we should be is not clear. Several 
scientists proposed predictions that ended up being wrong. The nuclear physicist Ernest Rutherford, in 1933, said 
that anyone who defended the possibility of one day extracting the energy contained in the atomic nucleus was 
"talking moonshine." Also, in 1896, Lord Kelvin said to not have the “slightest molecule of faith” in any type of air 
navigation besides ballooning. Could skeptics about the emergence of an AGI be victims of the same fate? 
Experts in the development of artificial intelligence predict that within 10 years many human activities will be 
surpassed by machines in terms of efficiency (Grace, Salvatier, Dafoe, Zhang, & Evans, 2017). A survey was 
conducted with several experts (N = 170) by Müller and Bostrom (2016) to assess the progress in AI research and 
prospects for the future. The survey showed that on average, there is a 50% chance that high-level machine 
intelligence will be achieved between 2040 and 2050, with a 90% probability by 2075. According to the 
interviewees' opinion, AI will outperform human performance between 2 (10% chance) and 30 years (75% chance) 
(Müller & Bostrom, 2016). In Müller and Bostrom's (2016) survey, 33% of respondents classified this development 
in AI as “bad” or “extremely bad” for humanity. 
In a similar survey conducted by Grace et al. (2017), the researchers interviewed (352 participants of the 2015 
NIPS and ICML conferences) believe that AI will outperform human performance in all tasks in 45 years, with a 
50% chance, and automate all human work in up to 120 years. In the research of Grace et al. (2017), when those 
evaluated were asked the question “Does Stuart Russell's argument for why highly advanced AI might pose a risk 
point at an important problem?”, 70% of respondents answered, “Yes” (Grace et al., 2017, p. 13). 
Besides the opinion of specialists in the field, another type of evidence that we can use to infer the possibility of 
a technological Singularity is how the economic growth rate has behaved during the history of human civilization, 
and how it's related to technological improvement.  
One of the most popular models found in the literature on our economic growth, from the Neolithic Revolution 
to the 21st century, is the growth model proposed by Michael Kremer (1993). Kremer's model is based on the 
following simple argument: Two heads think better than one, i.e., economic growth is driven by people having new 
ideas, and the more people, the greater the chance of new ideas. 
 
JFS September 2021 Corrêa and de Oliveira   
 
65 
For Kremer (1993), the total annual economic output is a function of the size of the population and the level of 
technology of this population. Kremer also assumes that if there are no changes in technology (e.g., advances in 
agriculture), if we have double the number of people working in a given piece of land, this will not necessarily 
double the food produced on this land. Thus, population growth depends on technological progress. At the same 
time, technological growth depends on population size, which makes the rate of population growth, technological 
progress, and economic production factors dynamically dependent on each other.   
One property of Kremer's growth model is that it indicates a form of hyperbolic growth, and hyperbolic curves 
tend to infinite values, i.e., at some point, we will reach some form of singularity. This model also suggests that 
such forms of growth should be separated when we reach a maximum population growth rate of 2100, with a global 
population between 9.6 billion and 12.3 billion people (Gerland et al., 2014). When this occurs, technological 
progress will no longer impact the global population. However, this does not mean that technological progress will 
stagnate.  
This type of model is sometimes referred to as the Hyperbolic Growth Hypothesis (HCH). HCH is one of the 
most accepted economic growth models by the macroeconomic community, and serves as the basis for other theories 
such as the Unified Growth Theory (Taagepera, 1979; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina, 2006; Oded, 2011; Jones, 
2013). Other authors also suggest a disassociation between population growth and economic/technological progress 
(Yudkowsky, 2013; Bostrom, 2014; Nordhaus, 2015; Agrawal, Gans, & Goldfarb. 2017). Thus, when high levels 
of automation are achieved, economic growth rates will become radically higher, producing more and more 
technological progress.  
Could this type of economic growth help the development of an AGI? Levin and Maas (2020) argue that when 
research involving advanced AI development is sufficiently theorized, efforts similar to the historic Manhattan 
Project could accelerate this project. At this point, international cooperation can change dramatically, causing 
implications for the stability of AI governance. At the time of the Apollo and Manhattan Projects, the U.S. 
government dedicated 0.4% of its GDP to accelerate the achievement of its objectives. This would currently amount 
to an annual budget of $80 billion to AGI R&D (Stine, 2009). A budget much larger than what was needed to 
accomplish some of the greatest technological achievements of the 21st century: 
1. The Large Hadron Collider (HHC) at CERN (Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire), took 10 
years to build, at an annual cost of $475 million (Knapp, 2012); 
2. The LIGO (Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory), had a total construction cost of US$ 
33 million (Castelvecchi, 2015); 
3. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor), one of the latest promises for clean and 
sustainable energy (a Tokamak nuclear fusion experimental reactor), is expected to be ready in 12 years at 
an annual cost of $2 billion (Fountain, 2017). 
One can see that neither of the projects mentioned above has received as much economic investment as the one 
dedicated to the Apollo and Manhattan projects (0.4% of the U.S. government's annual Gross Domestic Product), 
something that also explains the impressive speed with which the goals of both projects were achieved. Even so, 
significantly less investment did not prevent major scientific discoveries, e.g., decoding of the human genome and 
the detection of gravitational waves. Thus, it seems feasible to state that: When we have a robust enough theoretical 
understanding of the computational and cognitive processes responsible for the development of AGI, a Singularity 
may very well be “a Manhattan Project” away. 
Currently, there are several active projects to develop AGI. Baum (2017) identified 45 research and development 
projects intending to develop advanced artificial intelligence. The results of Baum's research are summarized in the 
table (Table 1) below: 
Table 1: Advanced AI R&D projects. 






Yes Not specified 
AERA CH Reykjavik University No Active 
AIDEUS RUS AIDEUS Not specified Active 






Not specified Not specified 
AIW SE 
Chalmers University of 
Technology 
No Not specified 
Animats SE 
Chalmers University of 
Technology 
No Not specified 
Baidu Research CN Baidu Not specified Not specified 
Becca USA Becca Not specified Not specified 
Blue Brain CH 
École Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne 
Not specified Not specified 
CN Brain Project CN 
Chinese Academy of 
Sciences 




Yes Not specified 
CogPrime USA OpenCog Foundation Not specified Active 
CommAI USA Facebook Not specified Moderate 
Cyc USA Cycorp Yes Not specified 








Yes Not specified 
FLOWERS FR 
Inria and ENSTA 
ParisTech 
Not specified Active 
GoodAI CZ GoodAI Not specified Active 
HTM USA Numenta Not specified Non-existent 
HBP CH 
École Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne 
No Not specified 
Icarus USA Stanford University Yes Not specified 
Leabra USA University of Colorado Yes Not specified 
LIDA USA University of Memphis Yes Moderate 
Maluuba CA Microsoft Not specified Not specified 
MicroPsi USA Harvard University Not specified Not specified 
MSR AI USA Microsoft Not specified Not specified 
MLECOG USA Ohio University Not specified Not specified 
NARS USA Temple University Not specified Active 
Nigel USA Kimera Not specified Not specified 
NNAISENSE CH NNAISENSE Not specified Not specified 
OpenAI USA OpenAI Not specified Active 
Real AI CN Real AI Not specified Active 
RCBII CN 
Chinese Academy of 
Sciences 
Not specified Not specified 
Sigma USA 
University of Southern 
California 
Yes Not specified 
YesA AT 
Vienna University of 
Technology 




Not specified Not specified 
SNePS USA 
State University of 
New York 
Yes Not specified 
Soar USA University of Michigan Yes Not specified 
Susaro UK Susaro Not specified Active 
TAIL CN Tencent Not specified Not specified 
UAIL USA Uber Not specified Not specified 
Vicarious USA Vicarious Not specified Moderate 




Not specified Active 
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In Table 1, we can see that of the projects reviewed, ten have links with the military (nine working for the U.S. 
government, and one for the government of Singapore), while only four reportedly have no links to the military 
industry. All other projects do not specify their association with military agencies. Besides, of the 45 projects 
reviewed, only 13 have active/moderate involvement with the area of AI safety, while two of the projects reviewed 
(Hierarchical Temporal Memory and Victor) disregard the need for security measures entirely.  
Jeffrey Hawkins, the leading researcher of the HTM (Hierarchical Temporal Memory) project, dismisses 
concerns related to advanced AI, stating, "I do not see machine intelligence representing any threat to humanity” 
(Hawkins, 2017, para. 3). And according to the 2AI Labs website, researchers give the following statement on risk 
scenarios involving advanced AI, "We think this is all crazy talk" (2AI Team, 2016, para. 2). The remaining 30 
projects do not specify any type of research focused on the area of AI safety. 
For those who follow the recent advances in the field of AI, it is known that one of the major paradigms of 
research today involves the problem of natural language processing (NLP), and the use of a new form of architecture 
called “Transformer”, proposed by Vaswani et al. (2017) in their seminal work, “Attention is all you 
need”. Currently, systems based on the transformer architecture are the new paradigm in NLP tasks, reaching the 
highest records in the GLUE benchmark (General Language Understanding Evaluation) in tasks such as translation, 
text summarization, text classification, and Q&A. 
Transformer models such as ELMo (Peters et al., 2018), BERT (Devlin, Chang, Lee, & Toutanova, 2019), GPT 
(Radford et al., 2019, Brown et al., 2020), and T-NLG (Corby, 2020), represent some of the most successful models 
in tasks involving NLP. GPT-2 has been used to generate several recent patent claims (Lee & Hsiang, 2019), while 
the GPT-3 language model is capable of generating samples of texts (e.g., poems, articles, news) from which human 
evaluators have difficulty distinguishing from human-produced text. 
Besides achieving state-of-the-art in several tasks involving natural language processing, GPT-3 may be one of 
the first AI models to show signs of generalization. For example, even though it has never been trained to perform 
mathematical operations (GPT-3 is “only” a language model), GPT-3 is capable of answering complex questions 
involving 3-digit arithmetic. GPT-3 is also able to demonstrate sophisticated physical/scientific reasoning when 
evaluated in the PIQA benchmark (Physical Interaction: Question Answering), reaching 81% accuracy without 
requiring any demonstration or parameter adjustment (Bisk, Zellers, Bras, Gao, & Yejin, 2019). To illustrate some 
of the capabilities of this model, the authors cite some of the answers that resulted from questioning it with the PIQA 
benchmark (the answers are in italics): 
How to ensure that all watches in the house are accurately adjusted? 
 Replace all analog clocks with digital clocks. That way, you set them once, and that's it. Check the batteries 
once a year, or, if you notice anything that seems a little out of the ordinary.  
How can I find something small that I lost on the carpet?  
 Place a hair net at the end of your vacuum cleaner and turn it on. 
In any case, there is no evidence that deep neural networks, such as Transformers, perform a type of information 
processing that makes them an AGI or seed AI. What we may infer is that this type of architecture allows the training 
of agents capable of solving several tasks that seem to be associated with general intelligence. Thus, the results and 
capabilities that models such as GPT-3 demonstrate only serve as weak evidence that Dartmouth's Summer Research 
Project on Artificial Intelligence, initiated by McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester and Shannon (1955, p. 2) with the 
proposal of “try to make machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, and solve types of problems 
hitherto reserved only for human beings”, may well be successful shortly. 
This sort of technology has the potential for malicious applications since any kind of socially harmful activity 
that uses advanced language models can also be enhanced. Whether generating fake news for mass disinformation, 
phishing, powering boots on platforms like Twitter to make it more biased (social engineering), or even writing 
fraudulent academic essays, NLP models have many dubious applications. Brown et al. (2020) provides a 
preliminary analysis in their study, where they report a series of limitations, unethical, and unsafe behaviors present 
in the GPT-3 model. However, as a positive aspect, this, at least, shows that certain organizations, such as OpenAI, 
engage in AI safety.  
Are the advances and alerts pointed out by the literature enough for our society to create a collective sense of 
responsibility and concern with these issues, or should such speculations still be considered only Futurology or 
science fiction? 
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Lessons from 2020: Coordination Problems 
Mike Davis, in his work “Beyond Blade Runner: Urban Control, The Ecology of Fear” (1992, p. 3), states that 
“extrapolative science fiction can operate as a pre-figurative for social theory while serving as a political opposition 
to cyber-fascism lurking on the next horizon.” Certain forms of philosophical thought, such as Transhumanism and 
Singulitarianism, seek to critically debate the possible futures that our social and technological acceleration may be 
co-creating, and how we can aim for human integration and flourishing rather than more dystopian possibilities. 
From this analysis, we can say that one of the premises for safety issues involving our technological advance relies 
on an idea of negative utopia: 
First and foremost, the utopian impulse must be negative: identify the problem or problems that must be 
corrected. Far from presenting an idyllic, happy and fulfilled world, utopias should initially present the 
root causes of society's ills [...] to act as a criticism of the existing system. (Tally, 2009, p. 115) 
Within this context, the authors believe that the preoccupations raised by the literature are not unjustified. 
Immersed in the current context in which our society lives, the pandemic of the new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, we 
may or may not learn certain lessons useful for other existential threats. Krakovna (2020) explores how our response 
to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic raises troubling questions involving our coordination capabilities to manage global 
crises and risks. 
As the authors have argued before, slow AI takeoffs are a much more likely scenario than scenarios where fast 
takeoffs occur. However, this does not mean that a slow takeoff is easier or less dangerous to manage. For a slow 
takeoff to be avoided, the same type of global coordination that we failed to demonstrate during the initial 
development of the new novel coronavirus pandemic would be required. Krakovna (2020) raises three large-scale 
coordination problems:  
1. The inability to learn from past experiences;  
2. The inability to respond efficiently to warning signals; 
3. Delay in reaching a global consensus on a problem.  
In analogy with the present global situation, global society has had the opportunity to learn from similar 
pandemics that occurred in the past, such as SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), which also appeared to 
have started in Guangdong, China. In November 2002, SARS caused 8,422 cases worldwide, with a fatality rate of 
11% (774 deaths in all were confirmed) (Chan-Yeung & Xu, 2003; Heymann & Rodier, 2004). One can also cite 
MERS-CoV (Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus), where the first reported cases occurred 
between 2012 and 2015. Cases of MERS-CoV were reported in more than 21 countries. At the time, the World 
Health Organization identified MERS-CoV as a probable cause of a future epidemic (de Groot et al., 2013; Wong, 
Li, Lau, & Woo, 2019). And finally, the Ebola virus epidemic that occurred in West Africa between 2013 and 2016, 
which was the largest outbreak of the disease in history, causing major losses and socio-economic disruption in the 
region (WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). 
Unfortunately, the lessons learned from past outbreaks of disease and pandemics have not been generalized to 
deal with the current scenario and the new difficulties that SARS-CoV-2 presents. Similarly, in a society where we 
increasingly need to adapt to new technological innovations involving AI, we may be tempted to think that society 
will be able to learn how to respond to the problems that more limited autonomous intelligent systems present to us. 
However, in the same way, that a new pathogen may find us unprepared (as in the case of SARS-CoV-2, the 
asymptomatic transmission), advanced AI may also confront us with challenges to which our old strategies and 
solutions may fail to generalize. 
Another problem involves the difficulty in carrying out an aligned and coordinated response to this type of threat. 
Had the responses of Western countries been done more quickly, remembering that the global west had at least one 
to three months to prepare for the alert launched by China in December 2019, numerous problems and losses would 
have been avoided. Experts such as Fan, Zhao, Shi, and Zhou (2019) point out that the possibility of a new 
coronavirus outbreak has been warned for at least two decades. Three zoonotic coronaviruses in the last two decades 
have been identified as the cause of large-scale disease outbreaks, SARS, MERS-CoV, and SADS-CoV (Swine 
acute diarrhea syndrome coronavirus). And still, little to no precautions were taken. 
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Simple safety measures, such as the stocking of masks and medical supplies, testing kits, and effective 
containment protocols, could have been taken but were not. Thus, if we fail to take relatively inexpensive preventive 
measures to early warnings of risks fully recognized by the epidemiological scientific community, how can we 
expect to react well in situations where the risk is unknown, and there is still no consensus on its possibility?  
The problem of social consensus is reflected in the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic by the indifference towards the 
warnings made by specialists in the last two decades. And the indifference to the fact that in January 2020, already 
with 10,000 confirmed cases, China had built a quarantine hospital in approximately six days (Williams, 2020). 
SARS-CoV-2 was labeled “an exaggeration,” or “just a little flu” by certain state leaders (Walsh, Shelley, Duwe, & 
Bonnett, 2020). Krakovna (2020) articulates a similarity between how we evaluated the risks of SARS-CoV-2 and 
how we evaluate possible risks involving advanced AI.  
While researchers who adopt a more skeptical stance towards the development of advanced AI are seen as 
prudent, researchers who advocate the adoption of preventive measures are taxed for fear-mongers. Couldn't there 
be a middle ground? Currently, the field of AI safety and AI ethics is considerably smaller than the area interested 
in developing advanced AI systems. 
One of the first obstacles we must overcome to achieve greater consensus on safety issues involving AI is the 
problem that “Artificial Intelligence” is a moving target. By moving target, the authors mean the following: When 
we attribute “intelligence” to something, it seems to be a self-assessment of our epistemic state, i.e., an intelligent 
act always seems to be something that we do not fully understand as it occurs. For example: if an individual can 
multiply large numbers quickly, say the square root of arbitrarily large numbers, or know the day of the week of 
arbitrary days, one may judge such an individual as intelligent or a mathematical prodigy. However, if such an 
individual explains to us how he performs such feats, and that in fact, they are nothing more than arithmetic/algebraic 
tricks which anyone can perform, the feat stops appearing as something intelligent. 
The same effect occurs when we seek to define machine intelligence. “Intelligence,” for critics of the 
computational thesis, being everything that AI is not. AGI researchers, like Wang (2008), argues for a more flexible 
conception of “intelligence” and “artificial intelligence”: 
AI should not be defined in such a narrow way that takes human intelligence as the only possible form 
of intelligence, otherwise AI research would be impossible, by definition. AI should not be defined in 
such a broad way that takes all existing computer systems as already having intelligence, otherwise AI 
research would be unnecessary, also by definition. (Wang, 2008, p. 9)  
Perhaps no one has proposed this argument more clearly than Edsger Dijkstra (1984, para. 10): “The question of 
whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim.” In the 
past, we thought that intelligence (whatever it is) should be required for, e.g., natural language processing; 
 GPT-3 is capable of performing such a task (Brown et al., 2020). 
Playing chess; 
 Deep Blue beats Garry Kasparov (Campbella, Hoane, & Hsu, 2002).  
Playing GO;  
 AlphaGO beats Lee Sedol (Silver et al., 2016).  
Playing “games” in general;  
 Agent57 beats humans in 57 classic Atari games (Badia et al., 2020). 
Be creative;  
 Intelligent Algorithms of Generative Design are able to find design solutions that humans would not be able 
to conceive, making it possible to perform 50,000 days of engineering in a single day (Oh, Jung, Kim, Lee, 
& Kang, 2019). 
Every time we realize that human intelligence isn't needed to perform a task, we discard such a task as proof of 
intelligence. Just as a submarine doesn't swim and yet can move through water and fire intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, artificial intelligence, indifferent to any anthropomorphic notion of intelligence we use, can still: influence 
the environment, adapt, make decisions, update hypotheses, pursue goals, and if programmed to do so fire 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. If we keep neglecting the capabilities of AI systems and marking them as 
unintelligent, the possibility of true unsafe AI may well be always left outside our hypothesis space. 
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The authors believe that the parallels drawn from the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the possible emergence 
of misaligned AGI can serve as weak evidence for the following statement: Our lack of global coordination in 
dealing with existential risks may well be our only and true existential risks. 
Conclusion 
In this article, the authors sought to provide the reader with a brief introduction to some problems often disregarded 
by contemporary AI ethics. As much as there is not yet a full consensus in the literature regarding the possibility of 
AGI creation, a significant portion of the scientific community believes that however unlikely such a possibility 
may be, safety measures should be taken and not disregarded.  
Should such warnings and advice be dismissed as exaggerations? As fear-mongering? Technological 
development does not slow down. The AI industry is increasingly able to produce autonomous systems that act 
proficiently in several domains, and little by little, these systems demonstrate the first traces of something we can 
call general intelligence. 
The AI industry is far from being aligned, as the global society, it lacks a common goal to coordinate its actions. 
As a final remark, the authors believe that the lessons we can learn about the current state we live, under the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic, can be useful if we are willing to learn from them. And two of these lessons are:  
1. When a risk, however small, is associated with something that represents an existential danger to global 
society, caution and security should not be synonymous with exaggeration and fuss; 
2. Lack of global coordination may be our biggest enemy after all. 
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